几年前，我听一位欧洲政客在饭后发表了一次演讲，他不仅在本国的政治生活中发挥着领导作用，还在欧盟(EU)的委员会中担任要职。当晚，这位政客对欧洲的价值观（文化、团结）及其制度的质量大加赞赏，得到了听众的普遍认同。他接着强调了欧盟更广泛推广这些价值观以及制度的必要性。
一些与我坐在同桌的人和我一样尴尬不已。让我难受的是，类似的话我也可以塞到世界历史上一些最不受欢迎的人物嘴里。这位政客描述的欧盟是一个帝国主义计划。炫耀大英帝国的人们曾经唱道：“你的疆土会越来越广，让你变得强大的上帝会让你变得更强大。”英国人或许还会唱“希望与荣耀之国”(Land of Hope and Glory)，但他们对于歌词已不再当真。然而，欧盟扩张的远景也是如此。
对于现代欧洲的缔造者来说，更广泛的同盟与更紧密的同盟同样重要。欧盟在希腊结束军事统治后仓促接受其加入欧盟，希望该国维持其脆弱的民主制度；西班牙和葡萄牙也很快被准许加入。所有后共产主义国家，只要有诚实程度说得过去的民主制度（有的连这个也没有），都获得了入盟许可。创建法国和德国货币联盟的雄心勃勃的计划扩大了范围，降低了加入标准，把大多数欧盟成员国包括在内。加入欧盟的主要条件变成了愿意。
当然，21世纪的欧洲与19世纪和20世纪的帝国有着巨大差异：特别是，传统的帝国主义者不寻求被殖民者的同意，同时它们压制多数民主表达形式。然而，如今希腊可能不会认为两者之间的差异特别大。
因此，问题是，与历史上很多帝国主义计划一样，欧洲一体化的地域界限是否超越了它能够合理维持的限度。欧盟如今面临的两个关系存亡的问题突显出这点：与俄罗斯的地缘政治冲突，以及外围经济体与欧元区之间的紧张关系。
除了1941-42年纳粹占领欧洲大部分领土的时候（人们最好忘记这个先例），西欧边界向东推进已达到历史最远。乌克兰危机考验的是，如此大规模的政治、经济和最终的军事支持的隐含承诺，在被要求兑现时能在多大程度上得到保持。波罗的海国家有合理理由对新盟友承诺的可靠性感到担忧。
现在几乎无人可以质疑这点：一开始让希腊加入欧元区是一个错误。这不仅仅是一个经济问题：捏造数据、挥霍过度以及无法偿还债务。希腊的核心问题是该国的政治制度不够成熟，无法实施有力的国家治理或经济管理，也无法以负责任的方式与西欧机构合作。希腊并非欧盟唯一一个可以适用这种批评的成员国。
历史上的帝国通常都是因为过度扩张而灭亡，过度扩张会导致外围国家人口难以驾驭，接着导致扩张计划的合理性在本国内遭到质疑。如今，欧洲也可见这些征兆。欧盟一直以来取得成功的途径是，总比欧盟机构能够游刃有余地支持、或人民准备好接受的水平更多一点和更快一点地推动一体化。或许这项雄心勃勃的战略现在已经走得太远了。（中国进出口网）
A few years ago, I heard an after-dinner speech from a European statesman, a person who has played a leading role not only in the political life of his own country but in the councils of the EU. The speaker that evening lauded, to general agreement, Europe’s values — its culture, its solidarity — and the quality of its institutions. He went on to stress the need for the unio to propagate these values and institutions more widely.
The discomfiture I felt was shared by some of those sitting with me at the table. My problem was that I could have put similar words into the mouths of some of the most unpleasant figures in world history. The EU that the speaker described was an imperialist project. Those who proclaimed the British empire used to sing: “Wider still, and wider, may thy bounds be set. God who made thee mighty, make thee mightier yet.” Britons may still sing “Land of Hope and Glory” but they no longer take the words seriously. Yet the expansion of the EU embraced a similar vision.
For the builders of modern Europe, wider unio has been as important as closer unio. Greece was hastily admitted in the hope of sustaining its fragile democracy after the end of military rule; Spain and Portugal followed soon after. Every post-communist state with passably honest and democratic institutions, and some without, has secured admission. The ambitious project of creating monetary unio between France and Germany was extended, by lowering admission standards, to include most EU members. The principal qualification for membership of a European club has been the desire to join.
Of course, there are big differences between the Europe of the 21st century and the empires of the 19th and 20th: notably, traditional imperialists did not seek the consent of those they colonised and they suppressed most forms of democratic expression. Yet Greeks today might not perceive these differences as being particularly large.
So the question is whether, like so many imperialist projects throughout history, the European project has stretched its territorial boundaries beyond the limits it can plausibly sustain. That question is highlighted by the two existential problems the EU faces today: the geopolitical confrontation with Russia, and the troubled relationship between peripheral economies and the eurozone.
The boundaries of western Europe have been pushed as far east as at any time in history, save for the best forgotten precedent of the Nazi occupation of most of the continent in 1941-42. The Ukraine crisis tests how far implied promises of political, economic and ultimately military support in that extension will be maintained when called on. The Baltic states have reasonable cause to feel nervous about the solidity of the commitment of their new allies.
Few people can now doubt that it was a mistake to let Greece join the euro in the first place. And this is not just a matter of economics — the fudged data, profligate spending and unpayable debts. The central Greek problem is that the country’s political institutions are not sufficiently mature to effect competent administration or economic management, or to engage in a responsible manner with the institutions of western Europe. And Greece is not the only member state of the EU to which that critique could be applied.
