中国货币获得储备货币地位，可能导致近3万亿美元被注入中国的债券和股票市场。我们对这笔资金的可能来源进行了仔细的研究。
将人民币纳入国际货币基金组织(IMF)储备货币篮子（被称为特别提款权(SDR)）这一举动本身，可能导致300亿美元在接下来的12个月里流入中国。
这部分资金将来自接受IMF资金的国家。IMF项目使用SDR作为记账单位，这些项目的受益国需要以SDR的基础货币对冲它们的负债。SDR货币篮子相当于2800亿美元，IMF宣布，人民币在货币篮子的权重将为10.92%，即相当于300亿美元。
然而，这个金额对从全局来看微不足道。人民币纳入SDR货币篮子的意义在于，这体现了中国到目前为止，在人民币国际化和资本账户开放等关键改革中取得了多大进展。
我们的研究结果显示，继续这些改革将强力推动国际投资组合再平衡，可能导致到2020年近3万亿美元流入中国。
为了客观衡量这些数字，并大致了解投资组合再平衡的全貌，我们对这些资金可能来自哪里以及将如何在中国各资本市场分配进行了分析。
基于指数权重、投资者类型以及我们所知的投资者经典资产配置模式，我们分析了不同资产类别的预期资金流入。
2.5万亿美元将流入中国债券市场…
鉴于中国政府债券市场的规模，我们预计其在花旗全球政府债券指数(Citi World Government Bond index)中的权重将达6.8%。中国政府债券被纳入之后，该指数规模将达到近21.3万亿美元，那么，投资组合若要维持指数权重，将需要大约1.46万亿美元流入中国政府债券市场。
我们认为，这一局面将分两个阶段达成，第一阶段是从今年7月开始的各央行逐渐增持，而当这个全球指数发生改变时，私人投资者将进行更大力度的投资。
在这些资金流中，我们预计7830亿美元将来自于全球各央行，理由是，我们假定，全球央行会把11.18万亿美元外汇储备的约7%配置成人民币，并绝大部分投资于政府债券。
另外900亿美元将来自其他公共部门的投资者，比如主权财富基金和公共养老金。他们管理的资产，不包括外汇储备，总计18.24万亿美元。然而，如今这些资产的具体配置情况不得而知，因此我们假定这些机构将66%的资产配置成债券，其中25%配置在海外，60%配置在主权债上。其中我们估计5%的资产将配置成中国主权债，也就是900亿美元。私营部门的投资者将占5840亿（1.46万亿减去7830亿再减去900亿）美元。
中国企业债和准主权债部门可能接收1.07万亿美元的资金流入。我们预测的理由是地方政府、政策性银行、企业目前发行在外的债券有约5.4万亿美元，以及假设海外投资者在这些领域的持有比例将为20%（与外国投资者在其他地方的类似市场持有的比例类似）。
中国政府债券和公司债市场总计将吸收2.53万亿（1.46万亿加上1.07万亿）美元的资金流入。
还有3840亿美元将流入股市
我们的研究表明，2016年流入中国股市的外国资本总计将达到3840亿美元。该数字基于两点：一是指数提供商MSCI明晟称中国A股市场在MSCI新兴市场指数中的权重将达到10.2%、二是我们估计，当A股被纳入后，该指数成分股总市值将达到3.76万亿美元。
在这3840亿美元中，430亿美元将来自主权财富基金和公共养老金。这个数字是这样计算出来的：假设这些投资者将其18.24万亿美元资产的22%配置成股票，其中10.6%配置在新兴市场，这其中的10.2%配置在中国A股市场，结果就是430亿美元。私人投资者将持有其余的3410亿（3840亿减去430亿）美元。
根据这些估算，我们认为投资者应该全面看待中国市场的风险和机遇，将中国经济增长放缓与中国政府改革可能带来的长期利益（比如这些资金流入）进行权衡。
海登布里斯科(Hayden Briscoe)为联博(AllianceBernstein)亚太固定收益主管，Vincent Tsui为联博亚太经济学家。以上观点不构成研究、投资建议或交易推荐，也未必代表联博所有投资组合管理团队的观点。（中国进出口网）
The move to confer reserve status on China’s currency is part of a process that could lead to nearly $3tn being injected into the country’s bond and equity markets. We’ve taken a close look at where the money could come from.
On its own, the inclusion of the renminbi in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of reserve currencies, known as the Special Drawing Right (SDR), could lead to capital flows of $30bn into China within the next 12 months.
These will come from countries that receive IMF funding. IMF programs use SDR as a unit of account, and countries that benefit from these programs need to hedge their liabilities in the underlying SDR currencies. The SDR basket is equivalent to $280bn, and the IMF has announced that the RMB will account for 10.92 per cent of the basket—hence the $30bn.
This is relatively small in the scheme of things, however. The significance of the renminbi’s inclusion in the SDR is that it’s a measure of the progress China has made to date with key reforms, such as the internationalisation of its currency and the liberalisation of its capital account.
Our research shows that a continuation of these reforms will force a rebalancing of global portfolios that could result in inflows to China of nearly $3tn by 2020.
To put these figures in perspective, and to gain a sense of the overall shape of the portfolio rebalancing, we have carried out an analysis of the likely sources of these flows and how they will be distributed across China’s capital markets.
We have analysed expected flows by asset category based on index weightings, types of investors and what we know of investors’ typical asset-allocation patterns.
$2.5tn for China’s Bonds…
Given the size of China’s government bond market, we expect it to account for 6.8 per cent of the Citi World Government Bond Index. The index will be capitalised at around $21.3tn after the bonds’ inclusion, so flows into the sector will need to be about $1.46tn just for portfolios to maintain index weight.
We see this happening in two phases, the first being an incremental increase from central banks which started this July and a bigger step for private investors when the global index is altered.
Of these flows, we expect $783bn from global central banks, based on our assumption that they allocate about 7 per cent of their $11.18tn in foreign exchange reserve assets into renminbi, and that they invest most of it in government bonds.
Another $90bn will come from other public sector investors, such as sovereign wealth funds and public pensions. Their assets under management, excluding foreign exchange reserves, total $18.24tn. There are no detailed breakdowns of portfolio allocations, however, so we assume that these institutions allocate a total 66 per cent to bonds, of which 25 per cent is allocated overseas and 60 per cent is allocated to government bonds. From this, we estimate that 5 per cent, or $90bn, will be allocated to Chinese government bonds. Private sector investors will account for $584bn ($1.46tn minus $783bn minus $90bn).
China’s corporate and quasi-sovereign bond sectors could receive inflows of $1.07tn. We estimate this on the fact that municipalities, policy banks and corporate bonds currently have about $5.4tn on issue, and on the assumption that overseas investors in these sectors will hold 20 per cent (which is similar to foreign investor holdings in comparable markets elsewhere).
In total, China’s government and corporate bond markets will soak up inflows of $2.53tn ($1.46tn plus $1.07tn).
…and $384bn for Equities
Our research suggests that foreign capital inflows into China’s equity markets will total $384bn in 2016. This figure is based on a statement by index provider MSCI that China A shares will account for 10.2 per cent of the MSCI Emerging Market Index and on our estimate that the index will be capitalized at $3.76tn when China is included.
Of this $384bn, $43bn will come from sovereign wealth funds and public pensions. We arrived at this figure by assuming that these investors allocate 22 per cent of their $18.24tn assets to equities and, of this, 10.6 per cent to emerging markets and then 10.2 per cent of that amount to China A shares. The balance of the $341bn ($384bn minus $43bn) will be held by private investors.
In light of these estimates, we believe that investors should maintain a balanced view of the risks and opportunities in China, weighing the country’s slowing economic growth against the long-term benefits—such as these inflows—which are likely to result from the government’s reforms.
Hayden Briscoe is director, Asia Pacific Fixed Income, and Vincent Tsui is Economist—Asia Pacific, at AllianceBernstein. The views expressed herein do not constitute research, investment advice or trade recommendations and do not necessarily represent the views of all AB portfolio-management teams.
